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Res Ipsa Loquitur in Malpractice Cases
in Canada
John H. Harland*
N A RECENT ISSUE OF THIS REVIEW, George E. Hall quoted one
of his mentors to the effect that the corpus delicti "don't mean
the dead body!" 1. One could multiply examples: "negligence"
does not mean "carelessness"; "virgo intacta" is a technical term
only, and so on. Res ipsa loquitur does not mean "the thing
speaks for itself." It implies both more and less than this.
As originally applied, it referred only to accidents caused by
a "thing" or an "instrumentality." In the "barrel case," 2 the
barrel rolled out of the warehouse, on its own, so to speak-the
exact cause of the accident remains unknown.
In the celebrated instance of bags of sugar being dropped
from a warehouse onto a customs officer, the Court held:
There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where
the thing is shown to be under the management of the de-
fendant or his servants, and the accident is such as, in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have
the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evi-
dence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that
the accident arose from want of care.3
The application of the maxim, under these circumstances, is
settled law in the common law provinces in Canada. Likewise
under the Civil Code of the Province of Quebec, Article 1054
provides that a person is liable for damage done by "things under
his care," unless he can show that he was not reasonably able
to prevent such damage.
However, over the years there has been an extension of ap-
plication to cases where the accident is due to a known human
agency.
Whether the maxim should apply in malpractice cases, in
particular in situations where the plaintiff can have no knowledge
of what went on, as in anesthetic explosions or the "swab" cases,
is a question which has vexed and confused Canadian legal minds.
* M.B., B.Ch.; Anesthesiologist, The Underhill Clinic, Kelowna, British
Columbia.
1 Hall, Lawyer meets Forensic Pathologist, 9 Clev-Mar. L. R. 238 (1960).
2 Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 2 H and C. 722.
3 Scott v. London and St. Katherine's Dock Co., (1865) 3 H and C. 596.
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We do not intend here to advocate or condemn its application in
malpractice cases, but simply to indicate the cases where it was
or was not applied, relying where possible on direct quotation
from the judgments.
The rule has been applied in one leading case of anesthetic
malpractice in this country,4 but to understand the reasons for its
application in that case it is necessary to review some earlier
British and Canadian decisions.
The New Brunswick Decisions
In an action arising out of damage caused by leaving part of
a pair of forceps in the plaintiff's abdomen, the Court said:
There are many cases in which the accident speaks for it-
self, so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the acci-
dent and nothing more . . . It is for the defendant, if he can,
to persuade the jury that the accident arose through no neg-
ligence of his. The maxim res ipsa loquitur applies when-
ever it is so improbable that such an accident would have
happened without the negligence of the defendant, that a
reasonable jury could find, without evidence, that it was so
caused.5
In 1937, Baxter, C. J., of the New Brunswick Supreme Court,
talking of the same case, held:
it is simply a case of res ipsa loquitur . . . The law is that
when an accident is such as, in the ordinary course of things,
does not happen, if those who have the management use
proper care, it is a case for res ipsa loquitur. The learned
trial judge so found, and I think there can be no possible
doubt that he was right in doing so.0
The Ontario Decision
The Ontario Courts are not obliged to follow the judgments
in other provinces or in England. Such decisions are merely
persuasive.
In 1937, in a case where a patient had been burned with a
diathermy apparatus, Masten, J. A., of the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal said:
. . . the principle of Scott v. London & St. Katherine's Dock
Company7 appears to me to apply and cast on the defendant
4 Crits and Crits v. Sylvester, (1956) 1 D. L. R. (2d) 502; Sylvester v. Crits,
1956) 5 D. L. R. (2d) 601.
5 Taylor v. Gray, (1936), XI Mar. Prov. Rep. 588.
6 Taylor v. Gray, (1937) 4 D. L. R. 123.
7 Supra, n. 3.
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the onus of affording such an explanation as rebuts the im-
plication of negligence; but as stated above no such explana-
tion is given.8
The Supreme Court of Canada subsequently confirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeal and Davis, J., said:
the Court of Appeal . . . treated the case as one of res ipsa
loquitur . . . It is unfortunate that the maxim of res ipsa
loquitur which serves satisfactorily when applied to certain
cases, where the cause of the accident is known, has be-
come a much overworked instrument in our Courts in recent
years and has been extended to apply to a great many dif-
ferent sets of facts and circumstances to which the rule,
when correctly stated and confined, has little or no applica-
tion. The rule is a special case within the broader doctrine
that the Courts act and are entitled to act upon the weight of
the balance of probabilities.9
However, two years later, McTague, J. A., said:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, no matter how ingeniously
stated, has no application to malpractice cases.'
In 1942 in the Ontario High Court, Hope, J., ruling in a case
of alleged anesthetic malpractice, said, talking of res ipsa loqui-
tur:
Although there seems to be some divergency of view in other
jurisdictions as to the applicability of this principle to cases
of malpractice, I am required to follow the application of the
principle as determined by the Ontario decisions.
He did not allow the maxim to be applied in that particular
case."
In an action resulting from a fatality following a spinal
anesthetic, heard before the Ontario High Court in 1945, Mr.
Justice LeBel said, as to the burden of proof:
It is clear, on the facts of this case, at any rate, that the bur-
den is upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendants, or
either of them, were negligent or unskillful.
12
The leading decision in Ontario, where the maxim was ap-
plied, is Holt v. Nesbitt.13 A dental patient was asphyxiated by
a throat pack. Judge Advocate Laidlaw said:
8 Fleming v. Sisters of St. Joseph.
9 Sisters of St. Joseph v. Fleming, (1938) 2 D. L. R. 417.
10 Clark v. Wansbrough, (1940) 0. W. N. 67.
lt Hughston v. Jost, (1943) 1 D. L. R. 402.
12 Walker v. Bedard and Snelling, (1945) 1 D. L. R. 529.
13 Holt v. Nesbitt, (1951) 4 D. L. R. 478.
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The learned trial judge [Aylen, J.,] stated in his judgment
"there is ample authority for the statement that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in such cases, and some
act of negligence must be proved."
However, he disagreed with this point of view:
In Mahon v. Osborne [an English decision 14] it was held by
McKinnon and Goddard, L. J. J. (Scott, L. J. dissenting),
that where . . . a swab . . . was left in a patient's body...
the rule applied so as to shift the burden of proof to the de-
fendant.
And later:
Scott, L. J., was of the opinion that the rule did not apply to
the circumstances of the particular case, but he did not de-
cide that it did not apply in any malpractice case. On the
contrary, it may be inferred from his reasons for judgment
that in his opinion there may be circumstances where the
rule is applicable in actions of negligence against a sur-
geon. . . In the light of the judgment of the Court in Mahon
v. Osborne, I am not prepared to accept or follow the opinion
of McTague, J. A., quoted above in Clark v. Wansbrough
(see n. 10, above).
Hogg, J. A., said, agreeing with Laidlaw, J. A.
I think the conclusion may be drawn. . . that where the neg-
ligence alleged is against a professional man such as a sur-
geon or dentist in the practice of his profession, the rule of
res ipsa loquitur is in general applicable.
The defendant subsequently appealed the case to the Su-
preme Court of Canada, 15 but was again unsuccessful. Kerwin,
J., disapproved the opinion in Clark v. Wansbrough and quoted
with approval Davis, J., in Sisters of St. Joseph v. Fleming (see
n. 9, above). He went on to say that the maxim could apply in
negligence cases depending on the circumstances, and that it ap-
plied here.
The English Decisions
It will be noted that Laidlaw, J. A., relied heavily on Mahon
v. Osborne, although not bound to do so, and it is of interest to
consider this decision and those that followed it in England. This
was a "swab" case. The trial judge had found against the de-
fendant surgeon who subsequently appealed. The appeal was
14 Mahon v. Osborne, (1939) 1 All E. R. 535.
15 Nesbitt v. Holt, (1953) 1 D. L. R. 671.
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allowed. Scott and McKinnon, L. J. J., gave the majority ruling
with Goddard, L. J., dissenting. In their judgments, Scott, L. J.,
disapproved of applying res ipsa loquitur to "swab" cases in gen-
eral; McKinnon, L. J., implied that it applied to the facts in this
case; Goddard, L. J., gave a strongly reasoned case for applying
the maxim to "swab" cases in general.
Lord Justice Goddard dissented from his brethren as to the
finding, but the dissenting opinion regarding the point of law is
that of Scott, L. J. The latter said:
It is difficult to see how the principle of res ipsa loquitur can
apply generally to actions for negligence against the surgeon
for leaving a swab in a patient, even if in certain circum-
stances, a presumption may arise . . . To treat the maxim
as applying in every case where a swab is left in the patient
seems to me an error of law. The very essence of the rule,
when applied to an action for negligence is that, upon the
mere fact of the accident happening, for example an injury
to the plaintiff, there arise two presumptions of fact (1) that
the event was caused by a breach, by somebody, of the duty
of care towards the plaintiff, and (2) that the defendant was
that somebody. The presumption of fact arises only because
it is an inference which the reasonable man, knowing the
facts would naturally draw, and that is in most cases for two
reasons (i) that the control over the happening, in such an
event, rested solely with the defendant, and (ii) in the
ordinary experiences of mankind, such as event does not
happen unless the person in control has failed to exercise
due care...
In the present case . . . I cannot see how it can be said that
the first essentials of this rule, if it can be called a rule,
apply. It is not necessary to enter upon any analysis of the
rule, which as Lord Shaw said in Ballard v. The North
British Railway Company,1' nobody would have called it a
principle if it had not been in Latin . . . Where complete
control rests with the defendant, and it is the general ex-
perience of mankind that the accident in question does not
happen without negligence, the maxim may well apply.
McKinnon, L. J., who joined Scott, L. J., in the majority
judgment said:
The plaintiff, having no means of knowing what happened
in the theatre, was in the position of being able to rely on
the maxim res ipsa loquitur, so as to say, that some one or
more of these five [surgeon, anesthetist, and three nurses]
must have been negligent, since the swab was, without
question left in the abdomen of the deceased.
16 Ballard v. North British Railway Co., (1923) S. C. 43.
May, 1961
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1961
RES IPSA IN CANADA
Goddard, L. J., in his dissenting judgment said:
In my opinion, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does apply in
such case as this . . . There can be no possible question but
that neither swabs or instruments are ordinarily left in the
patient's body . . If therefore a swab is left in the patient's
body, it seems to me clear that the surgeon is called upon
for an explanation.
In 1951 the Court of Appeal held that the rule applied in a
case where the patient's hand had been injured by a splint being
applied too tightly.17 Denning, L. J., said:
If the plaintiff had to prove that some particular doctor or
nurse was negligent, he would not be able to do it, but he
was not put to that impossible task. He says "I went into
hospital to be cured of two stiff fingers; I have come out
with four stiff fingers and my hand is useless. That should
not have happened if due care had been used. Explain it, if
you can!" I am quite clearly of the opinion that this raises a
prima facie case against the hospital authorities . . . which
they have not . . . displaced . . . and are liable in damages
to the plaintiff.
In the same case, Somervell, L. J., said:
• . . the hospital was responsible for all those in whose charge
the plaintiff was . . . The result seems to raise a case of res
ipsa loquitur.
In a case heard before the Court of Appeal in 1954,18 which
arose from the inadvertent injection of phenol into the spinal
canals of two patients, Somervell, L. J., said:
The learned judge said that the principle of res ipsa loquitur
could not apply to a case where the operation is, as he held
here, under the control of two persons, not in law respon-
sible for each other. Our attention was drawn to some ob-
servations in Mahon v. Osborne (see n. 14 above) which sug-
gest that this is too widely stated. As to the maxim itself, I
agree, with respect, with what was said by Lord Radcliffe
in Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co. Ltd.19 :
"I find nothing more in the maxim than a rule of evidence of
which the essence is that an event which, in the ordinary
course of things, is more likely than not to have been caused
by negligence, is by itself, evidence of negligence."
• . . In a case like this, there are points where the evidence
may shift, where a judge or jury might infer negligence,
17 Cassidy v. Ministry of Health, (1951) 1 All E. R. 574.
18 Roe v. Ministry of Health; Wooley v. The Same, (1954) 2 All E. R. 131.
19 Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co., (1950) 1 All E. R. 403.
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particularly if available witnesses, who could throw light on
what happened, were not called.
In the same case, Lord Justice Denning said:
The Judge has said that those facts do not speak for them-
selves, but I think they do. They certainly call for an ex-
planation . . .
However, he felt that the defendants had given an explana-
tion and held that "once the accident is explained, no question of
res ipsa loquitur arises." Commenting on the position where co-
defendants are not responsible, in law, for each other, he said
that they could not:
both avoid giving an explanation by the simple expedient of
each throwing the responsibility on the other. If an injured
person shows that one or the other, or both of two persons
injured him, but cannot say which of them it was, then
he is not defeated altogether. He can call on each of them
for an explanation.
Lord Justice Morris, in dealing with this last point, said
that it did not arise in this case as the anesthesiologist was the
servant of the Ministry of Health. He referred to res ipsa loquitur
as "this convenient and succinct formula" but pointed out that
it "possesses no magic qualities, nor has it any added virtue, other
than that of brevity, merely because it is expressed in Latin."
The Ontario Case Involving an Anesthetic Explosion
This essentially was the background with regard to the ap-
plication of the doctrine when the case involving an anesthetic
explosion came to trial.20 The infant plaintiff had been injured
by an explosion of oxygen and ether just prior to a proposed
tonsillectomy. On his behalf an action was launched against the
hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist.
In the Court of first instance, Mr. Justice Smily referred to
the opinions of Somervell and Denning, L. J. J., in Roe's case
(see n. 18 above), and quoted the Chief Justice of Canada, Sir
Lyman Duff in United Motor Service, Inc. v. Hutson:
Broadly speaking in such cases, where the defendant pro-
duces an explanation equally consistent with negligence and
with no negligence, the burden of establishing negligence
still remains with the plaintiff.21
20 Crits v. Sylvester, (1955) 3 D. L. R. 181.
21 United Motor Service Inc. v. Hutson, (1937) 1 D. L. R. 73.
May, 1961
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The Court felt that res ipsa loquitur should not apply and
found for all defendants. On appeal, however, the decision was
reversed. Judge Advocate Schroeder said:
Certainly the circumstances of the present case are such as
to entitle the plaintiff to invoke the rule of res ipsa loquitur.
In my opinion the facts do speak for themselves and call
upon the defendant S., for an explanation . . . Has the de-
fendant S. given an explanation as consistent with the ab-
sence of negligence, as with negligence on his part? In my
opinion he has not.
The case against the defendant hospital and surgeon was
withdrawn before judgment. The Judge Advocate was not there-
fore obliged to comment on the interesting question whether the
maxim would apply if there were more than one defendant, not
responsible to each other, where one or the other, but not both,
had been at fault. This matter would seem therefore to be an
open question at the moment. The Supreme Court of Canada
subsequently upheld the decision of the appellate court, but did
not comment on the aspect under discussion.
Decisions in the Common Law Provinces
In 1949, the Manitoba Court of Appeal (McPherson, C. J. M.,
Coyne and Dsyart, J. A. A.,) did not apply the doctrine in a case
where a surgeon omitted to remove a throat pack after a tonsil-
lectomy. In finding against the defendant, Coyne, J. A., said:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was raised, but it does not
apply here as the cause of the accident and the surrounding
circumstances are all known.22
In 1942, Bigelow, J., of the Saskatchewan Court of King's
Bench, trying a case where the plaintiff had developed an ab-
scess after giving blood, held that the plaintiff could rely on the
doctrine. 23 However, Gordon, J. A., of the Court of Appeal con-
sidered that it did not apply.24
In 1956, in a "swab" case, Doull, J., of the Supreme Court of
Nova Scotia did not apply the doctrine, but it is apparent that
this was because of the fact situation. The swab was in the pa-
tient's body, but it was uncertain at which, of six possible opera-
tions, the oversight had occurred. The Court indicated that had
22 Anderson v. Chasney, (1949) 4 D. L. R. 71.
23 Cox v. Saskatoon, (1942) 1 D. L. R. 74.
24 Cox v. Saskatoon, (1942) 2 D. L. R. 412.
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there only been one operation, the presence of the swab might
be "sufficient proof of negligence." 25
Decisions in the Province of Quebec
In Quebec, the jurisprudence is that of the civil law as cov-
ered by the articles of the Civil Code. However, even in that
province, the maxim has been discussed. In a malpractice case
involving damage from an improperly applied and unorthodox
method of leg traction, Mr. Justice Brossard of the Superior
Court of Montreal said in 1955:
If ever there was a case where the rule res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, this present case is the one.
It may be, however, that this was just a manner of speak-
ing, since he was referring, we feel, not to the case as a whole,
but rather commenting about a particular circumstance. How-
ever, later on he said:
Once Plaintiff had established that the method employed by
Defendant N., was not of recognized practice, and that . . .
it was by its very nature liable to cause pressure sores,
Plaintiff had fully discharged his burden of proof. The bur-
den then shifted to the Defendant to justify that his conduct
was not, in fact, faulty.26
The judgment went against the defendant surgeon, who sub-
sequently appealed. Mr. Justice Hyde of the Court of Queen's
Bench (Appeal side) had this to say:
I feel it necessary . . . to take respectful exception to re-
liance on this rule res ipsa loquitur as such. This rule is
borrowed from the common law and as it is liable to carry
with it certain overtones which are not necessarily applicable
in this Province, I think it is just as well to avoid it.27
In a "swab" case heard before Judge Lalonde of the Quebec
Superior Court in 1953, the Court said:
The sum total of the facts . . . create a presumption [of]
negligence, because it is inconceivable, even if we must set
aside all legal and judicial considerations, to believe that it
is normal that a swab should be lost during a surgical op-
eration.
25 Petite v. McLeod, (1956) 1 D. L. R. 147.
26 Mellen v. Nelligan, (1956) Rev. Leg. 129.
27 X v. Mellen, (1957) Q. B. (C. A.) 389.
May, 1961
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The Court felt that the defendant surgeon had failed to
exculpate himself from the presumption of negligence thus cre-
ated. In effect this is res ipsa loquitur.28 On appeal by the de-
fendant, the decision was upheld by Martineau and Gagne, J. J.
(McDougall, J. dissenting). In his dissenting opinion McDougall,
J., said:
I am of the opinion that this is not a case, in the final analysis
for the application of the rule res ipsa loquitur; any presump-
tion of negligence arising from that principle or rule having
been clearly rebutted. The rule or principle of res ipsa
loquitur is nothing more than the presumption envisaged by
Article 1238 of the Civil Code . . . Until proof is made, the
presumption persists but defendants are entitled to bring
evidence to rebut it.29
Summary
The maxim was first applied in a Canadian malpractice case
in 1937 in New Brunswick. It was not similarly used in any juris-
diction in the United States 'til 1944.30 In England there was
the dissenting judgment of Lord Justice Goddard in 1939 and
the doctrine was used in 1951.
In Ontario the doctrine was not applied in any malpractice
case 'til 1951 and not in a case of anesthetic malpractice 'til
1955. Although this common law doctrine is, strictly speaking,
not recognized under the civil law in Quebec, it was applied in
that province in a malpractice case in 1957.
As is evident from the above exegesis, the spectrum of ju-
dicial opinion on this vexed question is quite as broad in Canada
as in the United States. Julien C. Renswick, in a recent paper,3 1
thought that the chief reason for the courts approving the doc-
trine was the unwillingness of physicians to testify on behalf of
the plaintiff. We are not competent to assess the importance of
this factor in the United States, although such a "conspiracy of
silence" has been referred to, even in the lay press.3 2 We doubt
if this factor is the significant reason for the approximately simul-
taneous use of the principle in England and Canada. We rather
28 King v. Elder, S. C. #280274 (1953) (unreported).
29 Elder v. King, (1957) Q. B. (C. A.) 87.
30 Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P. 2d 687 (Cal. 1944).
31 Renswick, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Hospital and Malpractice Cases, 9 Clev-
Mar. L. R. 199 (1960).
32 Silverman, Doctors in Court, Sat. Eve. Post, April 18, 1959.
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favor Renswick's second reason-a method of redressing the bal-
ance in favor of a plaintiff who had no means of telling what had
happened during the material time when he was injured.
As Wasmuth says: "It all began 100 years ago, when a barrel
of flour fell from a warehouse and a learned judge spoke those
catchy Latin words: RES IPSA LOQUITUR." 33
33 Wasmuth, Legal Pitfalls in Anesthesia, 37 Anesthesia and Analgesia 385
(1958).
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